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Reforming the Hungárián lay justice system
In Hungary, like almost anywhere in the world, lay justice is 
a constantly recurring topic in the reflections on the judiciary. 
Since somé regard administering justice as a profession, there 
has been a continuous discussion whether lay participation is 
needed in addition to or instead of professional courts. The 
present study does nőt aim at taking part in the academic 
debate on the necessity of lay participation. One of the reasons 
fór this is that, in our view, no legal institution can be judged 
taken out from the particular historical context, legal system 
or structure of jurisdiction. Fór instance, it might prove to be 
difficult to argue against the jury if it plays an important political 
role in the independence movement of a nation and defies the 
repressive power through its verdicts. However, it might prove 
to be difficult to argue fór the jury if it functions primarily as a 
means of repressing ethnic minorities in a certain éra.
We will discuss a particular form of lay justice, which is 
present alsó in Hungary, by scrutinizing the dysfunction due to 
the peculiarities of the Hungárián society and jurisdiction. The 
reason fór this investigation is that, in our opinion, in Hungary 
there is a large gap between the intention expressed by the law 
and the everyday practice concerning this institution, established 
in other countries as well. We would like to emphasize, 
however, that we would like to avoid any statements that 
could be interpreted as the generál critique of this type of lay 
participation. We are convinced that under the same rules, bút 
in a different social setting, and under different implementation 
of law, the same institution could very well function efficiently. 
We alsó claim that there is an urgent need fór the reform of the 
Hungárián lay justice system.
* Szegedi Tudományegyetem , ÁJ К Jogbölcseleti és Jogszociológiai 
Tanszék (University of Szeged, Department of Philosophy and Sociology 
of Law) Address: 6726 Szeged, Rákóczi tér 1. E-mail: bado@juris.u- 
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1. H istorical precedents
In Hungary, it was already in the 19th century that the juries were established and 
those debates took piacé which, with a certain of emphasis, enumerated the most 
common arguments tor and against the necessity of the lay judges.
Those who know the history of Hungary will nőt find at all curious that at this time 
(and as it will be discussed later on, alsó at the beginning of the 1990s) it was the 
political role of the jury that became the focus of the contemporary discourse. Similarly 
to Tocquville’s1 or Justice Black’s1 2 arguments, the main reasons fór supporting this 
institution were the following: first, the importance of creating a counter-balance to the 
ruling power; second, the popularization of the implementation of law.3
The system of juries was introduced temporarily during the 1848 Hungárián 
revolution against the Habsburg dynasty, and re-introduced after the fali of the 
revolution, following the forced compromise (1867) with the Austrians. (Although 
juries were introduced during the revolution concerning cases related to the press, 
they were quickly abolished in 1852, under the open Austrian dictatorship.) It is 
therefore nőt surprising that, similarly to American settlers in former times, the jury 
could be regarded as a peculiar symbol alsó by the supporters of the independence 
of Hungary. Furthermore, at the time when the development of the bourgeoisie, 
though with a certain delay, finally started and the bourgeoisie wanted to participate 
more actively in the administration of public affairs, the jury could prove to be an 
excellent piacé fór achieving this objective.
The ephemeral jury system in Hungary was based on the French jury system 
imported through the Germans. The similarity is demonstrated mostly by the 
composition of the jury and the selection of jurors. The jury consisted of three 
professional judges and 12 jurors, bút after the random selection of jurors the 
prosecution and the defense could drop out disfavored persons in equal numbers. 
It was the population on which the selection was based that differed from the 
contemporary French system, as the number of those who could be selected fór jury 
service was more restricted than it was in the contemporary Francé.4
2. Lay judges during the period of the one-party system
The Hungárián jury system was swept away by the First World War, as after World 
War I it did nőt serve the interests of the Horthy-regime to have a court which could 
be the source of conflicts, since this court might even disregard the laws if something 
offended against its sense of justice.
1 Alexis de Tocqueville: A demokrácia Amerikában. (Democracy in America) Gondolat Kiadó, 
Budapest, 1983.
2 Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in Green v.U.S., 356 U.S. 165., 215-216. 1958.
3 Bónis- Degré- Varga: A magyar bírósági szervezet és perjog 2. Bővített kiadás. A kiegészítő' 
jegyzeteket írta: Dr. Béli Gábor. Zalaegerszeg 1996




After the Second World War, however, lay judges began to play an important 
role again. The transformation of the Hungárián judiciary started even before the 
communist takeover, and had as a consequence that this tieid, which was earlier 
relatively depoliticized, became an ideological battleground and, with respect 
to jurisdiction, the participation of people’s representatives as lay judges was 
considered by the Communist Party as one of the most efficient weapons in the 
ideological struggle. After the war, lay participation was realized, on the one hand, 
in the People’s Tribunals, established fór the investigation of war crimes, and on the 
other hand, in the traditional courts in the frame of a lay assessor system.
2.1 People’s Tribunals
The people’s tribunals and their institution fór appeal, the National Council of People’s 
Tribunals, were set up on 25 January, 1945, before the end of the war by the Provisional 
Government. Hungary was obliged by the Truce of Moscow to establish people’s 
tribunals and this obligation was reinforced by the Treaty of Paris, which ended World 
War II. People’s tribunals were organized at the seats of law-courts. The leaders of 
the councils were appointed by the Minister of Justice from among practicing lawyers 
and the six lay assessors were proposed by the five parties composing the so-called 
Independence Front and by the trade unions. The judges of the people’s tribunals had 
a three-month-long mandate, which was renewable. The first judgments were passed 
without legal authority. Later on, the authority of the people’s tribunals was extended 
to cases concerning the threat to peace. The new institution was intended to be a 
provisional one, and according to the first act on people’s tribunals, these courts would 
operate only until the restoration of the juries. The operation of the people’s tribunals 
marked the beginning of making mockery of justice.5 The sheer fact that in this period 
the people’s tribunals had to deal with an incredible number of cases compared with 
similar courts established in other countries, revealed that besides punishing the war
5 Before the people’s tribunal, the prosecution was represented by the people’s prosecutor 
nominated by the Minister of Justice. These were in many cases non-qualified lawyers who made 
serious mistakes concerning both the classification and the evidences. Their rhetoric was based on 
the pretentious slogans ofthe contemporary press. The strong position ofthe prosecution against 
the defense was striking. The words of the intimidated or party-loyal counsels resembled rather 
the speech of the prosecution than the speech of the defense. When the counsels represented 
too strongly the interests of the defendant, they were either reprímanded by the prosecutor or the 
judge or deprived of the right to represent the defense. Even the question whether the defendant 
had the right to choose his/her counsel was a matter fór debate. The Bar of Budapest, on the 
pretext of conformíng to public opíníon, decided that the defense of war criminals was to be 
represented only by an appointed counsel. At the time when one could choose one’s counsel there 
were still courageous counsels fór the defense. However, after the introduction of the system of 
appointed counsels it became possible to select the counsels on a political basis. The president 
of the people’s tribunal, who initially did nőt have the right to vote, was basically responsible fór 
the instruction of laypersons and fór the leading of the court hearing. However, the president had 
a large influence on the outcome of the cases. It was him who informed the lay judges about the 
law as it applied to the case, and about the possible sanctions. Consequently, it was nőt írrelevant 
fór the Communist Party who held this position.
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criminals these institutions served other objectives as well, namely the enforcement of 
party interests and the removal of political opponents.6 On the pretext of the punishment 
of war criminals which was required by the Western powers, the Communist Party led 
by Rákosi Mátyás began the elimination of the other parties with the help of these 
tribunals. All of a sudden more and more seditious elements were discovered among 
the members of the victorious political parties through the proceedings of people’s 
tribunals, mostly on the basis of false accusations. As a consequence, the members 
of the democratic parties either joined the Communist Party or left the political scene 
in order to avoid retaliation. Looking back it is quite difficult to understand how Rákosi 
and his party managed to control the institution of people’s tribunals to such an extent, 
while the people’s judges were delegated by five parties. This can be partially explained 
by the fact that the Communist Party aided by the Soviets had fiiled the positions of 
council’s leaders and those of people’s prosecutors by their party members before the 
democratic parties could react. Furthermore, the communists got somé of their party 
members to jóin various democratic parties and asked them to weaken these parties 
from inside. Finally, they had control over a considerable number of judges, who were 
intimidated by the threat that their pást would be revealed. Such illegal practices were 
either planned by the communists led by Rákosi or executed under the explicit orders 
of the soviet leadership. The proceedings of people’s tribunals therefore disregarded 
the proclaimed ideological objectives and instead of fascists it was often the members 
of the victorious democratic parties who were accused. After 1949 the people’s 
tribunals began to lose their importance, since their role was taken on by traditional 
courts. It was only after the 1956 revolution that they became significant political means 
again, when the conviction of revolutionaries had to be hidden behind the mask of “the 
people” to legitimize the régimé.7
2.2 The lay assessor system
In the course of 1948-1949 a turning-point came about when the communist takeover 
of the power inaugurated the éra of a governing system based on the Soviet 
example. At this time the new system required more definitely the reorganization 
of jurisdiction, and this marked the beginning of the epoch of socialist legislation. 
The process of legislation started with the reform of substantive and procedúrái law 
on the basis of the Soviet example. The modern codes having come intő existence 
under the Austro-Plungarian régimé were gradually replaced. We can alsó observe 
the commencement of the disintegration of the highly complex four-level jurisdiction 
system with the objective that a new jurisdiction system be created in accordance with 
the party organization and the administrative system. Act XI. of 1949, which limited the 
possibilities of appeal in the case of criminal proceedings, alsó ruled on the initiation *1
6 Between 1945 and 1950, about 10000 people were accused in Austria, 17000 in Belgium, less 
than 20000 in Czechoslovakia, and almost 70000 in Hungary
1 FLECK Zoltán: Jog a diktatúrában. Jogszolgáltató mechanizmusok a totális és poszt-totális 




of the lay assessor system, the authority of which was extended to other fields of law 
later on. This meant that the professional judges formed judicial councils together with 
the so-called lay assessors on various levels of the court system, in a way that the 
judges had equal rights within the council generally composed of one professional 
judge and two lay assessors.8
This system was practically the adaptation of mixed tribunals, present in Germany 
and other European countries, to the Hungárián legal system. It is interesting to note 
that this frequently criticized institution proved to be more persistent than anyone 
would have expected, given the fact that it is still in existence substantially in the same 
form. According the first act on lay assessors, this form of administration of justice was 
initiated on the one hand to ensure that the opinion, the sound view of life, and the 
natural sense of justice of the working people play a role during court hearings and 
in the passing of judgments, and on the other hand to make possible the democratic 
control of the judge. Taking intő consideration the particular political context, it is 
nőt difficult to realize the objective of the latter function of people’s tribunals. The 
aim was by no means to supervise the impartiality or the incorruptibility of the 
judge, bút to have control over the judges socialized in the former system. After the 
communist takeover of the power the judges appointed under the former régimé were 
progressively intimidated and removed. This could happen by assigning lay judges 
efficiently trained by the party leadership, who were to work with the professional 
judge, and had to report on his activity and obstruct his work. This was made possible 
by the new law which from the very beginning gave equal rights to the lay assessor 
and the professional judge. That is to say, if the law ordained the participation of the 
lay assessor, professional judges and lay assessors had to administer justice strictly 
together in every phase of the procedure from the determination of issues of fact and 
law to the passing of the judgment.
After the Stalinistera, however, this institution gradually lostits political significance, 
and the dominance of professional judges became more and more manifest. In other 
words, from the 1960s, the stabilization of the communist régimé and the considerable 
changes in the composition of the judicial society made it unnecessary to use lay 
judges fór political reasons. With the emergence of loyal judges with a more and more 
technocratic view, the lay persons lost their importance.
Previous research from the perspective of the sociology of law carried out by 
Kulcsár Kálmán9 at the beginning of the 1970s already demonstrated this trend. 
The results of these studies show that the participation of lay assessors is quite low, 
their contribution to the making of the judgment is exceptional. Although numerous 
reasons of this dysfunction were revealed by the researchers, the most important one 
proved to be the selective process, which made it possible that usually elderly, retired 
people be “selected”, who would nőt “disturb” the work of the professional judge.
8 ZINNER Tibor: Háborús bűnösök, népbíróságok. História, 1982: IV. évf.. 2. sz.
9 Kulcsár Kálmán: A népi ülnök a bíróságon. (Lay assessors in court) Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest 1971.
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3. Lay assessor system after the change of the political system
It becomes obvious from the above discussion that in Hungary lay participation 
cannot be regarded as a great success of the 20th century. What is most surprising 
is the fact that while most institutions discredited in a similar way were abolished or 
transformed, the lay assessor system is still in existence although it is widely known 
that this system does nőt work properly and that the recrutation of the necessary 
number of lay assessors causes constant problem.
Almost immediately after the free elections in 1990, there is a demand fór the 
reform of the lay justice system, the main objective of which was the introduction of the 
jury in Hungary10 1. After the dictatorship, this demand seemed to be logical fór many 
people, and they argued by underlining only the political advantages which were 
proclaimed by authors from Lord Devlin11 to the ones quoted above. The legitimacy 
of jurisdiction should be reinforced by increasing the role of voters in the same way 
as the election of members of Parliament creates the legitimacy of legislation directly, 
and that of the executive power indirectly. The political advantages alone could nőt 
convince those who had ambivalent feelings towards the jury in terms of competence. 
This is the reason why the proposals on the introduction of the jury were removed 
from the agenda in spite of historical traditions.
However, the arguments managed to weaken or wipe out those efforts which 
would have set out the future of Hungárián judiciary in the opposite direction by 
intending to eliminate the role of lay persons.
Finally, due to the practical problems of the selection of lay assessors, the lay 
assessor system was modified only to the extent that the number of cases requiring the 
participation of lay judges was limited and that the term “people’ assessor”12, typical 
fór the socialist éra, was replaced by the term “assessor”13. However, this institution 
remained pseudo-democratic and practically unnecessary in its present form.
3.1 Rules presently in force
One of the greatest attempts at the reform of the Hungárián judiciary was made 
in 1997. The alterations affect principally the court organization and the external 
administration of courts. (The court system became more complex and the role of 
the Ministry of Justice was taken over by the National Council of Jurisdiction, which is 
composed mostly of judges.) The reform alsó contained changes concerning the lay 
assessor system. (We claim, however, that the reform was nőt far-reaching enough to 
solve this problem of the Hungárián jurisdiction.)
10 Botos Gábor: Az esküdtbíróság újbóli bevezetéséről. In: Rendészeti Szemle. A 
Belügyminisztérium folyóirata.2 / 1992 11.-51.





According to the new law, the assessors work together with judges in administering 
justice. They obtain this position by election, based on the principle of people’s 
sovereignty. The lower age limit to be able to become an assessor is raised írom 
24 to 30. This alteration is parallel with the rise in the lower age limit of becoming a 
judge. The selection of the assessors follows principally the former regulation. The 
assessors are nominated by Hungárián citizens having domicile under the jurisdiction 
of the court and a right to vote, by the local governments under the jurisdiction of the 
court and by non-governmental organizations with the exception of political parties. 
Depending on the level of the court which assessors will be assigned to, they are 
selected by various bodies of local governments. The law did nőt change the four- 
year-long mandate of the assessors. The preparation of the selection and the decision 
how many assessors should be selected fór particular courts belong to the authority 
of the National Council of Judiciary. The date of the election is set by the President 
of the Republic. The assessors are assigned to the particular judicial councils by the 
president of the court. In contrast to the former regulation the new law provides in 
details on when and how the term of Office of the assessors expires. The assessor is 
allowed to hold this position until the age of 70. In the judicature the assessors still 
have the same rights as the professional judges.14 Furthermore, there is a raise in 
the inadequately low remuneration, which is thereby adjusted to the responsibility 
characteristic fór the position of a judge.15
3.2 Reality and reform
As a result of the modification somé positive alterations can be observed. (The upper 
age limit of 70, fór instance, excludes the possibility that really old people incapable of 
following the events of a court hearing become lay assessors.) However, there is still a 
large gap between the pretentious rules and the reality. In our opinion, the new rules 
did nőt change essentially this institution, which thus remained dysfunctional.
Yet, we are convinced that, taking intő consideration the rules of Hungárián 
procedúrái law, mixed judicature in the proper sense of the word is needed on every 
level of the court system. One should nőt be a partisan of legal realism to be aware 
of the risk of letting a single judge reach decisions which have a large influence on 
the lives of citizens, as such decisions depend highly on the actual State of mind and 
powers of concentration of a single person. Without the intention to take part in the 
debates on the necessity of lay participation, we claim that due to budgetary limits 
and the Hungárián court system this problem can be solved only by promoting lay 
participation in today’s Hungary.
The above-mentioned problem manifests itself mostly in the so-called local courts 
representing the lowest level of the judicial hierarchy. These courts have to deal with 
the majority of the cases. However, it is exactly in these courts that in many cases
14 However, the equal rights are nőt parallel with equal obligations. The assessor is allowed 
to be the member of a party, which is alsó reínforced by a decision of the Constitutional Court: 
(51/1992. (X.22)
15 Act LXVII of 1997, §122-128
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young (30-40-year-old) and inexperienced judges pass judgments alone16, and in 
more serious cases together with two lay assessors.
Furthermore, they have to deal with hundreds of cases at the same time without 
an adequate number of administrative assistants. Nevertheless, concerning criminal 
proceedings the Flungarian procedúrái law gives especially great power - particularly with 
respect to the consideration of evidences - to the judges in the courts of the first instance. 
(The part of their judgment related to the consideration of evidences cannot be changed 
in principle by the appeal court.) In such a situation it would be of paramount importance 
that the professional judge would nőt have to bear the full weight of responsibility and to 
decide alone on people’s future. At present, lay persons are nőt ready to assume a role with 
such high responsibility. Despite the legislators’ intention fór them to have such a role it is 
obstructed by the selection process, by the survival of lay judges’ behavior developed in 
the socialist éra, and by the prejudices of the professional judges etc. As we have already 
mentioned, it would be possible according to law that the lay persons outnumbering 
the professional judges reach a decision opposed to that of the professional judge. 
Flowever, there are hardly any examples in the judicial practice of the pást few decades 
where the professional judge, disagreeing with the judgment, expressed his dissenting 
opinion attached to the court’s decision.17 Yet, according to the judges the lay persons 
might make useful remarks especially if they have better knowledge of an issue than the 
professional judge owing to their profession. The results of our previous study18 show 
that the judges do nőt consider the lay persons as equal partnere, they are nőt involved in 
the passing of decisions, which is nőt expected by the majority of assessors either. Evén 
those assessors who initially are active to a certain extent shortly take on a passive role, 
adapting themselves to the traditions, and become mere observers of the events. Taking 
all this intő consideration it is nőt surprising that assessors are often mockingly called 
‘ornaments’ by the lawyers. This ironic attitűdé was alsó reinforced by the amendment of 
the existing law in 1995. The situation of the assessors is best characterized by the fact 
that their replacement has no consequence in terms of procedúrái law. That is to say, 
assessors can be changed freely during the procedure. Should the date of the court 
hearing nőt be suitable fór one of the assessors, s/he can be replaced by the judge in 
charge of the assignment of the assessors. Knowing what happens in practice we can 
point out that the present form of the lay assessor system is nothing bút the caricature 
of people’s participation. This is why we find that a comprehensive reform in this respect 
cannot be further postponed in order to give sense to the already existing institution by 
acknowledging the necessity of mixed tribunals.
In our view the problem could be solved by making the assessors’ service 
civic duty19, by elaborating carefully the selective mechanism, and by ensuring an 
appropriate remuneration fór the assessors. We are convinced that in order to achieve
16 In criminal proceedings in case ofcrímes which can be sanctioned by nőt more than three 
years of imprisonment
17 Az ítélkezők felelőssége — Magyar Nemzet 1999. március 24. 7.p
18 BADÓ Attila & NAGY Zsolt: Az ülnök szerepe a bíróságon. (The role of assessors in court). 
Manuscript.
19 Orat least it should become an activity giving such an amount of social esteem that it would 
become really possible to choose írom the applicants
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the above-mentioned objectives the Hungárián lay assessor system should adopt of 
Solutions used in juries and lay assessor systems in other countries.
At present those become lay assessors who would like to. This intention is usually 
fueled nőt by an insatiable desire tor participating in the administration of justice bút 
rather by the modest remuneration or by the ‘appetitus societatis’. Itwas demonstrated 
by the last few assessors’ selections that there are much fewer candidates fór 
this position than it would have been necessary. 20Even today, the overwhelming 
majority of the candidates are senior citizens, who represent a particular segment of 
society. It might sound strange considering the efforts made by other countries, and 
especially by the United States to enforce the ‘fair cross-section requirement’ and 
the constitutional requirement of impartiality. Although the theoretical and practical 
problems of the selective mechanism are known21, it is evident that experiences from 
America, from Francé and other countries could prove to be useful. It is unacceptable 
that with the exception of the judge responsible fór the assignment of the assessors, 
no one else has the right guaranteed by procedúrái law to make objections to the 
choice of the assessors. We do nőt intend to give work fór the sociologists and 
psychologists22, bút we think that the “voir dire” procedure could be applied with 
certain restrictions in the case of assessors.
Other patterns related to the passing of judgments ensuring the responsibility and 
the reál participation of lay persons could alsó be applied. Fór instance, secret voting 
on certain issues, on guilt, and on the sanctions could be made mandatory. We are 
convinced that through such modifications carried out following the suggestions of 
experts the present situation could be altered in a way that the positive effects should 
be felt by the professional judges as well.
In the present paper, we do nőt aim at giving effective suggestions concerning the 
reform. Our only objective was to draw attention to intolerable situation of Hungárián 
lay assessor system, which can discredit lay justice and which calls fór an urgent 
solution. In order to be able to make effective suggestions, in addition to studies from 
the perspective of the sociology of law, there is a need to reveal and solve practical 
problems, which should be based on active cooperation of experts representing 
various fields of law. We hope that we should nőt wait long until the beginning of such 
cooperation.
20 Lassan befejeződik a laikus bírák választása Népszava 1997. október 30. 6. p
21 Mitchell S. Zuklie (1996) Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, California Law 
Revies Vol. 84:101
22 Sage, Wayne (1973): Psychoiogy and the Angéla Davis Jury. Humán Behavior Magaziné, 
January, 56-61.Murray SAMS, Jr. (1969) „Persuasion in the Voir Dire: The Plaintiff’s Approach,” 
in Persuasion: The key to damages 3-8 G. Holmes ed.
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